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Abstract
Background: The global spread of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) has been mirrored by diffusion of
misinformation and conspiracy theories about its origins (such as 5G cellular networks) and the motivations of
preventive measures like vaccination, social distancing, and face masks (for example, as a political ploy). These
beliefs have resulted in substantive, negative real-world outcomes but remain largely unstudied.
Methods: This was a cross-sectional, online survey (n=660). Participants were asked about the believability of five
selected COVID-19 narratives, their political orientation, their religious commitment, and their trust in science (a 21-
item scale), along with sociodemographic items. Data were assessed descriptively, then latent profile analysis was
used to identify subgroups with similar believability profiles. Bivariate (ANOVA) analyses were run, then
multivariable, multivariate logistic regression was used to identify factors associated with membership in specific
COVID-19 narrative believability profiles.
Results: For the full sample, believability of the narratives varied, from a low of 1.94 (SD=1.72) for the 5G narrative
to a high of 5.56 (SD=1.64) for the zoonotic (scientific consensus) narrative. Four distinct belief profiles emerged,
with the preponderance (70%) of the sample falling into Profile 1, which believed the scientifically accepted
narrative (zoonotic origin) but not the misinformed or conspiratorial narratives. Other profiles did not disbelieve the
zoonotic explanation, but rather believed additional misinformation to varying degrees. Controlling for
sociodemographics, political orientation and religious commitment were marginally, and typically non-significantly,
associated with COVID-19 belief profile membership. However, trust in science was a strong, significant predictor of
profile membership, with lower trust being substantively associated with belonging to Profiles 2 through 4.
Conclusions: Belief in misinformation or conspiratorial narratives may not be mutually exclusive from belief in the
narrative reflecting scientific consensus; that is, profiles were distinguished not by belief in the zoonotic narrative,
but rather by concomitant belief or disbelief in additional narratives. Additional, renewed dissemination of
scientifically accepted narratives may not attenuate belief in misinformation. However, prophylaxis of COVID-19
misinformation might be achieved by taking concrete steps to improve trust in science and scientists, such as
building understanding of the scientific process and supporting open science initiatives.
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Background
As coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) has spread
around the globe, the scientific community has
responded by conducting and providing unprecedented
access to research studies related to COVID-19 [1]. Early
in the course of the pandemic, researchers noticed the
spread of misinformation, conspiracy theories (causal at-
tribution to “machinations of powerful people who at-
tempt to conceal their role”) [2], and unverified
information about COVID-19 [3, 4], which has taken the
form of false/fabricated content and true information
presented in misleading ways [5]. This deluge of infor-
mation has introduced confusion among the public in
terms which sources of information are trustworthy [6],
despite the open conduct of epidemiological research
and other scientific work on COVID-19.
Although one might expect that improved access and
visibility of research would result in increased trust be-
ing placed in scientists and the scientific enterprise, a
preliminary study failed to find such a change between
December 2019 and March 2020 in the United States
(US) [7]. Peer reviewed studies exist alongside misinfor-
mation about medical topics, the latter of which is easily
accessible in the US and is associated with differential
health behaviors (e.g., who gets a vaccine, or who takes
herbal supplements) [8]. As we describe and demon-
strate subsequently, belief in misleading narratives about
COVID-19 can have substantive, real-world conse-
quences that makes this both an important theoretical
and practical area of study. At the same time, evidence
suggests that belief in misinformation is not patho-
logical, but rather that it merits treatment as a serious
area of scientific inquiry [9].
Misinformation and conspiracy theories
Research on misinformation and conspiratorial thinking
has burgeoned in recent years. Because this work has fo-
cused both on misinformation and conspiratorial think-
ing, we use these terms consistently with the specific
studies cited, but somewhat interchangeably.
Consistent with the proliferation of misinformation
about COVID-19, it has been proposed that conspiratorial
thinking is more likely to emerge during times of societal
crisis [10] and may stem from heuristic reasoning (e.g., “a
major event must have a major cause”) [11]. At the same
time, endorsement of misinformation or conspiracy seems
to be common, with evidence from nationally representa-
tive research indicating that approximately half of US resi-
dents endorsed at least one conspiracy in surveys from
2006 to 2011, even when only offered a short list of possi-
bilities [12]. A recent study of COVID-19 conspiracy the-
ories similarly found that nearly 85% of a representative
US sample of 3019 individuals believed that at least one
COVID-19 conspiracy theory was “probably” or
“definitely” true [13]. The widespread nature of this
phenomenon logically suggests that endorsing misinfor-
mation is unlikely to be caused by delusions or discrete
pathology.
Factors associated with beliefs
Previous research on factors associated with belief in
misinformation or conspiracy theories has produced
varying, and sometimes inconsistent, findings. The en-
dorsement of misinformation has been found to vary
across sociodemographic groups. For example, studies
have identified that both low [14] and high [15] educa-
tion levels are positively associated with belief in certain
conspiratorial ideas. In addition, individuals who per-
ceive themselves to be contextually low-status may be
more likely to endorse conspiracy theories, especially
about high-status groups, but social dynamics likely
affect this substantively [16].
Political orientation is generally believed to be associ-
ated with conspiratorial endorsement or belief in misin-
formation, and some studies have reported that
conservatism predicts believing or sharing misinformed
narratives. For example, sharing “fake news” on Face-
book during the 2016 US presidential election was asso-
ciated with political conservatism and being age 65 or
older, though researchers acknowledged potential omit-
ted variable bias and pointed to the potential confound-
ing (unmeasured) role of digital media literacy [17].
However, other researchers have suggested that strong
political ideology on either side (left or right) is more ex-
planatory [18], and that associations vary depending on
the political orientation of the conspiracy or misinforma-
tion itself [19]. Consistent with the latter explanations, a
preprint by Pennycook et al. examined data from the US,
Canada, and the UK and found that cognitive sophistica-
tion (e.g., analytic thinking, basic science knowledge) was
a superior predictor of endorsing misinformation about
COVID-19 than political ideology, though none of the in-
cluded variables predicted behavior change intentions
[20]. This mirrored his prior finding that lower levels of
analytic thinking were associated with inability to differen-
tiate between real and fake news [21].
Though less well studied, religiosity, too, may be asso-
ciated with general conspiratorial thinking (e.g., believing
that “an official version of events could be an attempt to
hide the truth from the public”), but the relationship is
likely complex and mediated by trust in political institu-
tions [22]. Researchers have also posited positive, indir-
ect relationships between religion and endorsement of
conspiracy theories. This might have a basis in the con-
ceptual similarity between an all-powerful being (as de-
scribed in many religions) and a hidden power
orchestrating events or hiding the truth, the latter of
which is a core feature of conspiratorial thinking [15].
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The importance of misinformation about COVID-19
Misinformation about COVID-19 is an important area
of study not just theoretically, but also because of the
potential for these beliefs to lead to real-world conse-
quences. The present study examined four core misper-
ceptions about COVID-19that contributed to short-term
adverse consequences (situated alongside a fifth narra-
tive that reflects scientific consensus). The mispercep-
tions were drawn from Cornell University’s Alliance for
Science, which prepared a list of current COVID-19
conspiracy theories in April, 2020 [23]. These were:
a. [5G Narrative] Although viruses cannot be spread
through wireless technology, theories associating
5G wireless technology with COVID-19 have prolif-
erated [24] and led to more than 70 cell towers be-
ing burned in Europe (predominantly the United
Kingdom) and Canada [25].
b. [Gates Vaccine Narrative] Between February and
April 2020, varied conspiracies linking Bill Gates to
COVID-19 (e.g., as a pretext to embed microchips
in large portions of the global population through
vaccination) were the most ubiquitous of all con-
spiracy theories related to the virus [26]. Among
other direct consequences, a non-government
organization that became linked with this theory
ended up calling the US Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation for help after being targeted online [27].
c. [Laboratory Development Narrative] Research
indicates that COVID-19 is a zoonotic virus (see
papers published in February by Chinese scientists
[28] and in March by a group of scientists from the
US, United Kingdom, and Australia [29]). However,
officials in both the US and China have accused the
other country of purposefully developing COVID-
19 in a laboratory, often with the implication of
military involvement [30, 31].
d. [Liberty Restriction Narratives] While less clear-cut
than the other examples provided here, debate has
continued as to the seriousness of COVID-19 and
the appropriate set of public health responses. A
common thread has been the assertion that the true
threat from COVID-19 relates to liberty (e.g., mask
requirements, social distancing) rather than the
virus itself. In some cases, individuals who have
publicly derided proposed protective measures like
social distancing have subsequently died from
COVID-19 [32]. In other cases, these disagreements
have become vitriolic and couched as a deliberate
infringement on Constitutional rights. For example,
the Governor of Kentucky was hung in effigy during
a protest during Memorial Day weekend [33], and
there has been a series of incidents where prevent-
ive measures like mask-wearing in public have
become brief, violet flashpoints, resulting in out-
comes up to and including murder [34].
We cannot be certain, yet, about the long-term effects
of beliefs about COVID-19on the landscape of US polit-
ics, treatment of vulnerable populations, and other
longer-term outcomes. Lessons from prior viral epi-
demics such as human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)
suggest that misinformation like AIDS denialism, when
embedded, can result in avoidable morbidity and mortal-
ity [35]. Further, in the time between preparation and
submission of this article (May/June 2020) and revision
during peer review (October 2020), researchers have also
begun to strongly suggest the need for continued and
multifaceted research on COVID-19 misinformation, in-
cluding the nature of misinformed beliefs and how to
prevent their uptake. For example, the editorial board of
The Lancet Infectious Diseases issued a warning about
the impact of COVID-19 misinformation in August [36].
Dr. Zucker, the Health Commissioner for New York
State, published a commentary indicating that combat-
ting online misinformation is “a critical component of
effective public health response” [37]. Other concerning
outcomes have also begun to manifest. Perhaps most not-
ably, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation prevented
an attempted kidnapping and overthrow of the Governor
of the State of Michigan in early October 2020 that was
predicated, at least in part, by the perception that a state-
wide mask mandate for COVID-19 was unconstitutional
[38]. Coincidentally, an interrupted time-series study pub-
lished the same week illustrated the efficacy of non-
pharmaceutical preventive behaviors, such as mask use,
on reducing morbidity and mortality from COVID-19
[39]. Clearly, research on COVID-19 misinformation has
both a theoretical and practical underpinning.
Addressing misinformation
Misinformation can be difficult to address in the public
sphere because it requires the source of information be
trusted [40], while the very nature of misinformation
often hypothesizes that experts or authorities are work-
ing to conceal the truth. Krause and colleagues (2020)
note that it is important for scholars to be honest and
transparent about the limits of knowledge (e.g., uncer-
tainty), and that simply asserting one’s trustworthiness
or accuracy is likely an insufficient step to take [40]. Fur-
ther, one cannot assume that “fact checkers” are trusted
by the public to be objective, or that objective presenta-
tion of data will simply overturn misinformation, espe-
cially when it is value-laden [40]. Timing of information
provision may also matter. Studies have suggested that
people may be less inclined to share or endorse misin-
formation or conspiracy theories if they are presented
with reasoned, factual explanations prior to their
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exposure to misinformation [41]. However, this was not
found to be true after exposure; stated differently, factual
information may be capable of prevention, but not treat-
ment [41]. This finding is consistent with theories about
fact-based inoculation conferring resistance to argumen-
tative persuasion [42].
Adding additional complication, just as misinforma-
tion tends to proliferate within a social echo chamber
where few individuals interact with content “debunking”
misinformation, scientific information tends to be shared
within its own echo chamber. Thus, it may be rarely
interacted with by those who do not already agree with
the content [43]. So even if a scientific source of infor-
mation is trusted, and “gets out ahead” of misinforma-
tion, there is a risk it will never reach its intended
audience. The summed total of this information led us
to conclude that: (a) it is both practically and theoretic-
ally important to understand the factors underlying en-
dorsement of misinformation about COVID-19, (b)
certain indicators might be, but are not definitively, asso-
ciated with endorsement of misinformation, including
political orientation, religious commitment, and educa-
tion level, and (c) if scientists and “fact checkers” are not
trusted by some individuals (whether rightly or wrongly),
the degree of trustworthiness assigned to scientists may
be an underlying mechanism that can explain belief in
conspiratorial theories about COVID-19.
To investigate this question, we adopted a person-centered
approach to identify profiles of beliefs about COVID-19 nar-
ratives. Importantly, these profiles incorporated perceived be-
lievability not only of misinformation, but also of a
scientifically-accepted statement about the zoonotic source
of COVID-19. To identify belief profiles, we used Latent Pro-
file Analysis (LPA), a specific case of a finite mixture model
that enables identification of subgroups of people according
to patterns of relationships among selected continuous vari-
ables (i.e., “indicators,” in mixture modelling terminology)
[44]. The goal of LPA is to identify the fewest number of la-
tent classes (i.e., homogenous groups of individuals) that ad-
equately explains the unobserved heterogeneity of the
relationships between indicators within a population.
We hypothesized that 1) there are distinct profiles of
individuals’ beliefs in different narratives related
to COVID-19; 2) trust in science and scientists, as con-
ceptualized in prior research on this topic [7, 45], is
lower among subgroups that endorse misinformation or
conspiracy theories about COVID-19, even after control-
ling individuals’ sociodemographic characteristics, polit-
ical orientation and religious commitment.
Methods
Data collection
Data were obtained on May 22, 2020, from a sample of
660 US-based Amazon Mechanical Turk (mTurk) users
ages 18 and older (individuals must be age 18 or older
to enroll as an mTurk worker). A relatively new data
collection platform, mTurk allows for rapid, inexpensive
data collection mirroring quality that has been observed
through traditional data collection methods [46, 47], in-
cluding generally high reliability and validity [48].
Though not a mechanism for probability sampling [48],
mTurk samples appear to mirror the US population in
terms of intellectual ability [49] and most, but not all,
sociodemographic characteristics [50].
To ensure data quality, minimum qualifications were
specified to initiate the survey (task approval rating >
97%, successful completion of more than 100, but fewer
than 10,000 tasks, US-based IP address) [50]. Additional
checks were embedded within the survey to screen out
potential use of virtual private networks (VPNs) to
mimic US-based IP addresses, eliminate bots, and man-
age careless responses [51]. Failing at these checkpoints
resulted in immediate termination of the task and exclu-
sion from the study, but no other exclusion criteria were
applied. Participants who successfully completed the sur-
vey were compensated $1.00 USD.
Instrument
Sociodemographic questions
Participants were asked to indicate their age (in years),
gender [male, female, nonbinary, transgender], race
[White, Black or African American, American Indian or
Alaska Native, Asian, Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander,
Other], ethnicity [Hispanic or Latino/a], and education
level [less than high school, high school or GED, associ-
ate’s degree, bachelor’s degree, master’s degree, doctoral
or professional degree]. Due to cell sizes, race and ethni-
city were merged into a single race/ethnicity variable:
[non-Hispanic White, non-Hispanic Black or African
American, Hispanic or Latino/a, Asian, and Other].
Believability of COVID-19 narratives
Participants were asked to rate the believability of differ-
ent statements about COVID-19 using a Likert-type
scale from 1 (Extremely unbelievable) to 7 (Extremely
believable). This response structure was drawn from
prior research on believability (e.g., Herzberg et al. [52]).
Four narrative statements were drawn and synthesized
from Cornell University’s Alliance for Science [23]. An
additional statement was based on the zoonotic explan-
ation [28, 29]. The statements were prefaced with a sin-
gle prompt, reading: “There is a lot of information
available right now about the origins of the COVID-19
virus. We are interested in learning how believable you
find the following explanations of COVID-19.”
The statements below were used to form the profiles
of believability of COVID-19 narratives:
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1. “The recent rollout of 5G cellphone networks
caused the spread of COVID-19.”
2. “The COVID-19 virus originated in animals (like
bats) and spread to humans.”
3. “Bill Gates caused (or helped cause) the spread of
COVID-19 in order to expand his vaccination
programs.”
4. “COVID-19 was developed as a military weapon (by
China, the United States, or some other country).”
5. “COVID-19 is no more dangerous than the flu, but
the risks have been exaggerated as a way to restrict
liberties in the United States.”
Trust in science and scientists
Participants were asked to complete the Trust in Science
and Scientist Inventory consisting of 21 questions with 5-
point Likert-type response scales ranging from 1 (Strongly
disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree). After adjusting for reverse-
coded items, the mean value of the summed scores of 21
questions was used to indicate a level of trust ranging
from 1 (Low Trust) to 5 (High Trust) [45]. The scale dem-
onstrated excellent reliability for this sample (α = .931).
Religious commitment
Participants were asked to describe their “level of reli-
gious commitment (this refers to any belief system)” on a
scale from 1 (Low) to 10 (High).
Political orientation
Participants were asked to describe their “political orien-
tation” on a scale from 1 (Liberal) to 10 (Conservative).
Statistical analysis
Four stages of analyses were conducted. First, descriptive
statistics were computed and reported for believability of
COVID-19 narratives, religious commitment, political
orientation, trust in science, and sociodemographic char-
acteristics (e.g., race/ethnicity, sex, sexual orientation,
education level). Means and standard deviations (SD)
were used to describe continuous variables (e.g., believ-
ability of COVID-19 narratives, age). Unweighted fre-
quencies and weighted percentages were used to
describe categorical variables (e.g., race/ethnicity, gen-
der). We used Stata 15.1 for statistical description and
bivariate inference (Chi-square [χ2] and t-tests).
Second, Latent Profile Analysis (LPA) was conducted
using Mplus version 8 (Muthen & Muthen, Los Angeles,
CA) to delineate subgroups of belief patterns related
to COVID-19 among participants [44]. We used max-
imum likelihood and a robust estimator (Huber-White,
MLR estimator in Mplus) to handle the non-normal dis-
tribution of the indicators (absolute value of skew ranged
from 0.30 to 1.67, and of kurtosis ranged from 1.70 to
4.39). LPA is an unsupervised machine learning
technique to identify unobserved groups or patterns
from the observed data [44, 53]. Compared to traditional
cluster analysis, LPA adapts a person-centered approach to
identify the classes of participants who may follow different
patterns of beliefs in COVID-19 narratives with unique esti-
mates of variances and covariate influences. Since no other
study has investigated this question or these variables, we
followed an exploratory approach to identifying the number
of classes by testing increasingly more classes until the value
of the log likelihood began to level off (1–5 latent classes).
To determine the final number of classes, we systematic-
ally considered conceptual meaning [54], statistical model fit
indices [55], entropy [56], and the smallest estimated class
proportions [55]. Model fit indices included the Akaike In-
formation Criterion (AIC), Bayesian Information Criterion
(BIC), and adjusted BIC, with the smaller values representing
greater model fit [55, 57–59]. Entropy ranged from 0 to 1,
with the higher values indicating better distinctions between
the classified groups and a value of 0.60 indicating good sep-
aration [60]. Models that included class sizes with less than
1% of the sample or that did not converge were not consid-
ered due to the risk of poor generalizability [61]. The
Vuong-Lo-Mendel-Rubin Likelihood Ratio Test (LMR) [62]
was further used to test whether models with k classes im-
proved the model fit versus models with k-1 classes (a signifi-
cant p-value<.05 suggested such improvement). Full
information maximum likelihood (FIML) estimation was
used to handle missing data [63–65].
Third, bivariate analyses were conducted between the
study variables and the classified groups using analysis of
variance (ANOVA). A Bonferroni correction for multiple
comparisons was applied. Finally, multivariate multinomial
logistic regressions were used to examine the utility of trust
in science in identifying COVID-19 narrative groups, adjust-
ing for all sociodemographic variables, political orientation,
and religious commitment. Significance testing was 2-sided
and carried out at the 5% significance level.
Results
Descriptive statistics
Of the 660 participants (see Table 1), 61.82% were male
(n=408). The majority were White (n=399, 60.45%),
followed by Hispanic (n=121, 18.33%) and Black or Afri-
can American (n=68, 10.3%) participants. The average
age of participants was 24.80 (standard deviation [SD] =
11.94). More than half held a bachelor’s degree (n=335,
50.83%). The mean scores of political orientation, reli-
gious commitment, and trust in science were 4.82 (SD=
3.13), 4.82 (SD=3.78) and 3.65 (SD=0.71), respectively.
For the full sample, believability of the narratives
varied, from a low of 1.94 (SD=1.72) for the 5G nar-
rative to a high of 5.56 (SD=1.64) for the zoonotic
narrative. Means for each narrative statement are pro-
vided in Table 1.
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Profiles of beliefs in COVID-19 narratives
Based on model fit statistics (see Table 2), we selected a
4-class model. The LMR test was non-significant when
comparing the 5-class to the 4-class model, the model fit
indices of the 4-class model were the smallest among 1-
to 4- class models, and the entropy was over 0.60 and
the highest of all the estimated models (entropy =
0.994). The smallest class of the 4-class model was also
larger than 5% of the total sample (8.18%).
Figure 1 shows the mean believability of COVID-19
narratives statements across the 4 identified profiles.
– Profile 1 (n= 463, 70.15%), the largest class, generally
believed the scientific consensus narrative about
COVID-19 and tended not to believe in other narra-
tives. This group reported the lowest believability
scores for the 5G narrative (mean = 1.00, SD=0.00),
the Bill Gates vaccine narrative (mean = 1.43, SD=
1.06), the laboratory development narrative (mean =
2.70, SD=1.83), and the liberty restriction narrative
(mean = 2.28, SD=1.67). It also reported high believ-
ability for the zoonotic narrative (mean = 5.76, SD=
1.61).
– Profile 2 (n= 54, 8.18%) considered all of the
narrative statements to be highly plausible, reporting
the highest believability scores for the 5G narrative
(mean = 6.31, SD=0.47), zoonotic narrative (mean =
5.80, SD=1.18), Bill Gates vaccine narrative (mean =
5.11, SD=1.73), laboratory development narrative
(mean = 5.52, SD=1.61), and the liberty restriction
narrative (mean = 5.41, SD=1.78).
– Profile 3 (n= 77, 11.67%) reported low-to-moderate
believability for all of the narrative statements. In
most cases, this class had the second-lowest belief
scores for narrative statements, but also, notably, the
lowest score for the zoonotic narrative (mean =
4.59, SD=1.71).
– Profile 4 (n= 66, 10.00%) reported fairly high
believability for most narratives (similarly to
Profile 2). However, this group diverged from
Profile 2 in indicating lower plausibility of the 5G
narrative (mean = 4.55, SD=0.50), though it was still
a higher level of belief than for Profiles 1 and 3.
As indicated in Table 3, profiles differed significantly
across racial/ethnic groups, education levels, political
orientation, religious commitment, and trust in science.
These findings are provided for transparency and















Less than High School 1 (0.15)
High School or GED 109 (16.54)
Associate Degree 72 (10.93)
Bachelor 335 (50.83)
Master 122 (18.51)
Doctoral /Professional 20 (3.03)
Political orientation 4.81 (3.13)
Religious commitment 4.82 (3.78)
Trust in science 3.65 (0.71)
Believability of COVID-19 Narratives
5G Narrative 1.94 (1.72)
Zoonotic Narrative 5.56 (1.64)
Gates Vaccine Narrative 2.27 (1.88)
Laboratory Narrative 3.28 (2.00)
Liberty Restriction Narrative 2.96 (2.04)
GED General Education Development Test or General Education Diploma, SD
Standard deviation
a Education level was treated as a continuous variable in later analyses
Table 2 Latent profile analysis model fit summary
Model Log Likelihood AIC BIC SABIC Entropy Smallest Class % LMR p-value LMR meaning
1 − 6682.848 13,385.696 13,430.619 13,398.868 – –
2 − 5908.942 11,849.884 11,921.759 11,870.959 0.987 0.19091 < 0.001 2> 1
3 − 5707.847 11,459.694 11,558.523 11,488.673 0.989 0.09545 < 0.001 3> 2
4 − 5554.458 11,164.915 11,290.698 11,201.797 0.994 0.08182 < 0.001 4> 3
5 − 5442.434 10,952.868 11,105.604 10,997.653 0.980 0.02424 0.139 5< 4
n = 660; The LMR test compares the current model to a model with k −1 profiles
AIC Akaike’s Information Criterion, BIC Bayesian Information Criterion, SABIC Sample-Adjusted BIC, LMR Lo-Mendell Ruben
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context, but the primary associative findings are those in
the next subsection (e.g., the multivariate models).
Multivariate models predicting COVID-19 belief profiles
The multivariate regression models (see Table 4) con-
trasted Profiles 2 through 4 with Profile 1 (which was
the profile expressing belief in the zoonotic narrative but
the lowest belief in the other narratives). Controlling for
race/ethnicity, gender, age, and education level, individ-
uals with greater trust in science were less likely to be in
Profile 2 (AOR=0.07, 95%CI=0.03–0.16), Profile 3
(AOR=0.20, 95%CI=0.12–0.33), and Profile 4 (AOR=
0.07, 95%CI=0.03–0.15) than Profile 1. In addition, study
participants with greater religious commitment were
more likely to be in Profile 3 (AOR=1.12, 95% CI =
1.02–1.22) than Profile 1. No other significant differ-
ences related to religious commitment were observed,
though it appears that with a larger sample size a similar
religious effect may have been significant for Profiles 2
and 4. Political orientation was not associated with belief
profiles in the multivariate models.
Discussion
This study tested two preliminary hypotheses about be-
liefs in narratives about COVID-19. We had hypothe-
sized that individuals would be separable into distinct
latent classes based on belief in various narratives about
COVID-19, and the LPA analysis identified four statisti-
cally and conceptually different subgroups. Further, we
speculated that trust in science was lower among that
groups that reported high believability for misinforma-
tion about COVID-19, which was partially supported by
our results. These results should be interpreted as sup-
porting the plausibility of these explanations, but as al-
ways, should be replicated and further investigated
before definitive conclusions are made. We specifically
encourage further replication and extensions of this
work and support open dialogue about the findings and
their implications.
Profiles of COVID-19 belief subgroups
Prior research on conspiracy theories has suggested that
many people in the US believe in at least one conspiracy
theory [12], and that those who do may believe in mul-
tiple conspiracy theories [13]. Our LPA analysis, which
included believability not only of conspiracy theories/
misinformation, but also of the current scientifically-
accepted zoonotic explanation for COVID-19, affirmed
this finding and added considerable detail.
Profile 1 reported the lowest believability for each mis-
informed narrative and reported high believability of the
zoonotic narrative. This may suggest that people who
are skeptical of misinformation tend to believe the scien-
tifically accepted narrative. Interestingly, however, the
converse was not true. In fact, the highest believability in
the zoonotic explanation was observed for Profile 2,
which reported the highest believability for all explana-
tions. Further, Profile 4 was fairly similar to Profile 2,
Fig. 1 Latent profiles of believability of COVID-19 narratives
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except for lower endorsement of the 5G theory, which
we subjectively note is the least plausible theory on its
face, given a complete lack of scientific evidence that
wireless technology can transmit a virus. Finally, Profile 3
reported low to moderate believability for all narrative
statements but reported the lowest endorsement for the
zoonotic explanation. This is also important to note, as
it suggests that a generally neutral position on the be-
lievability of misinformed narratives does not necessarily
translate to endorsement of a scientifically-accepted
narrative.
Our data support the existence of multiple and distinct
belief profiles for COVID-19 misinformation. Based on
these findings, we speculate that one reason providing
factual information has not always reduced endorsement
of misinformation [41] is that latent groups of people
exist for whom belief in a scientifically-accepted explan-
ation is not a mutually exclusive alternative to belief in
misinformation (e.g., Profiles 2 and 4). For people be-
longing to these subgroups, convincing them of the val-
idity of the scientifically-accepted explanation may
simply increase their belief in that explanation, without
Table 4 Multivariate multinomial logistic regressions (reference = profile 1)
Variables Profile 2 Profile 3 Profile 4
(n= 54, 8.18%) (n= 77, 11.67%) (n= 66, 10.00%)
AOR (95%CI) AOR (95%CI) AOR (95%CI)
Political orientation 0.98 (0.85–1.13) 0.90 (0.81–1.00) 1.01 (0.88–1.15)
Religious commitment 1.16 (0.99–1.34) 1.12 (1.02–1.22)* 1.14 (1.00–1.31)
Trust in science 0.07 (0.03–0.16)** 0.20 (0.12–0.33)** 0.07 (0.03–0.15)**
AOR Adjusted Odds Ratio, 95% CI 95% Confidence Interval; Controlled for race/ethnicity, gender, age, and educational levels
*p< 0.05 **p< 0.001
Table 3 Descriptive statistics by four latent profiles
Variables Profile 1 Profile 2 Profile 3 Profile 4
(n= 463, 70.15%) (n= 54, 8.18%) (n= 77, 11.67%) (n= 66, 10.00%)
n (%)/mean (SD) n (%)/mean (SD) n (%)/mean (SD) n (%)/mean (SD)
Sex
Male 274 (59.18) 41 (75.93) 49 (63.64) 44 (66.67)
Female 183 (39.52) 13 (24.07) 28 (36.36) 22 (33.33)
Binary/Trans 6 (1.30) 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00)
Race/ethnicity***
White 326 (70.41) 14 (25.93) 38 (49.35) 21 (31.82)
Black 29 (6.26) 11 (20.37) 16 (20.78) 12 (18.18)
Hispanic 47 (10.15) 27 (50.00) 16 (20.78) 31 (46.97)
Asian 48 (10.37) 2 (3.70) 5 (6.49) 2 (3.03)
Others 13 (2.81) 0 (0.00) 2 (2.60) 0 (0.00)
Age 24.89 (12.02) 23.98 (11.62) 25.17 (11.91) 24.42 (11.88)
Education level*** 3.70 (1.06) 4.17 (0.93) 3.83 (0.86) 4.17 (0.90)
Political orientation*** 4.17 (3.00) 6.96 (2.81) 5.22 (2.80) 7.08 (2.74)
Religious commitment*** 3.84 (3.82) 7.56 (2.44) 6.43 (2.73) 7.55 (1.92)
Trust in science*** 3.90 (0.64) 2.92 (0.42) 3.27 (0.56) 2.93 (0.38)
Believability of COVID-19 Narratives
5G Narrative 1.00 (0.00) 6.31 (0.47) 2.32 (0.47) 4.55 (0.50)
Zoonotic Narrative 5.76 (1.61) 5.80 (1.18) 4.59 (1.71) 5.08 (1.58)
Gates Vaccine Narrative 1.43 (1.06) 5.11 (1.73) 3.01 (1.56) 4.95 (1.62)
Laboratory Narrative 2.70 (1.83) 5.52 (1.61) 3.79 (1.59) 4.89 (1.49)
Liberty Restriction Narrative 2.28 (1.67) 5.41 (1.78) 3.55 (1.78) 5.11 (1.66)
n = 660
SD Standard deviation
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concomitant reductions in belief in alternative narra-
tives. In addition, it is important to note that even Pro-
file 1, which was the most skeptical of misinformation
and which expressed high believability for the zoonotic
explanation, reported a mean believability value > 2 for
two alternative narratives (laboratory development and
liberty restriction). Though such narratives are not
strongly supported by currently-available evidence, nei-
ther are they scientifically impossible (as is the 5G the-
ory). The liberty restriction narrative, in particular, is
multifaceted. While evidence continues to accumulate
that COVID-19 is a more serious health threat than in-
fluenza (e.g., US Centers for Disease Control and Pre-
vention provisional death counts [66]), there may still be
disagreement about the appropriate public health re-
sponse. For example, even given the evidence for sub-
stantial and positive outcomes from mask-wearing
requirements [38], their implementation continues to be
contentious. Thus, in some ways, failure to reject all al-
ternative narratives with complete certainty better re-
flects true scientific work better than would absolute
rejection of all alternative narratives [40], because they
may reflect complex and interlinked systems of beliefs.
Predictors of COVID-19 belief subgroups
In our multinomial logistic regression models, control-
ling for race/ethnicity, gender, age, and education level
(as well as the other predictor variables), political orien-
tation was not significantly associated with belonging to
any particular COVID-19 belief subgroup. This finding
is consistent with some prior hypotheses [12], but it is
important to reiterate, given the tenor of current polit-
ical discussion in the US. This is not to say that a bivari-
ate or multivariate association between belief in
misinformation and political orientation cannot be iden-
tified [67], but it is to suggest the possibility that trust in
science may be an underlying variable driving this
differentiation.
Although religious commitment was significantly asso-
ciated with being part of Profile 3 versus Profile 1, the
magnitude of this association was not particularly large
in comparison to the findings related to trust in science.
In addition, examining the confidence intervals inde-
pendently of significance levels, one might reasonably
speculate that belonging to any of Profiles 2 through 4
might be potentially associated with increased religious
commitment. It may be the case that the trust in science
variable captures some of the complexity that has been
observed in associating religion and belief in misinfor-
mation [22].
Finally, low trust in science was substantially and sig-
nificantly predictive of belonging to Profiles 2, 3, and 4,
relative to Profile 1. However, those profiles were distin-
guished from Profile 1 not by their failure to believe in
the zoonotic explanation, but by their endorsement of
alternate explanations. In other words, trusting science
and scientists appears to be associated with lower likeli-
hood of expressing a belief pattern that endorses narra-
tives that are definitively, or likely to be, misinformed. In
this sense, trust in science was conceptually less related
to what narrative to believe, and more related to what
narrative(s) are more appropriate to disbelieve.
It is important, on a surface level, to understand the
potential importance that trust in science has in under-
standing how people perceive competing narrative expla-
nations about a major event like the COVID-19
pandemic. Unlike political orientation and religious
commitment, which can become part of a personal iden-
tity (and hence may be more difficult to modify), trust in
science is, on its face, a potentially modifiable character-
istic. From a public health standpoint, the strength of
the association between trust in science and misinforma-
tion believability profiles, combined with the potential
mutability of the ‘trust in science’ variable, may indicate
a potential opportunity for a misinformation interven-
tion. However, the solution is not likely to be as simply
as “just asserting that science can be trusted.” First, con-
sider the conflict described earlier in this manuscript,
where there is an inherent tension between conspirator-
ial thinking and trusting expert opinion. If it were true,
for example, that 5G networks were being used to
spread COVID-19, then the authorities doing so, and de-
siring to hide it, would have an interest in debunking the
5G narrative. If “science” and “authority” or “government
bodies” become conflated, then lower trust in science
may result from distrust of authority, thereby affecting
believability of explanations [68]. Thus, one important
consideration might be the importance of working to en-
sure that science remains non-partisan, including careful
vigilance for white hat bias (distortion of findings to sup-
port the “correct” outcome) [69].
Second, although as researchers we believe in the
power of the scientific approach to uncover knowledge,
there have been well-documented cases of scientific mis-
conduct, such as the 1998 Wakefield et al. paper linking
vaccines and autism [70], as well as other concerns
about adherence to high-integrity research procedures
[71]. Anomalies or other issues related to research part-
nerships can occur as well. While this paper was being
prepared for submission, a major COVID-19 study on
hydroxychloroquine was retracted due to issues with
data access for replication [72]. At the same time, as re-
searchers, we understand that a single study does not
constitute consensus, and that not all methods and ap-
proaches yield the same quality of evidence. Science, as a
field, scrutinizes itself and tends to be self-correcting –
though not always as rapidly as one might wish, and sys-
tems regularly have been reconfigured to ensure
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integrity [73]. In the time between submission and revi-
sion of this paper following peer review, randomized,
controlled trials of hydroxychloroquine have been pub-
lished and have served to disambiguate its clinical utility
for COVID-19 (e.g., the RECOVERY trial) [74]. In this
case, the scientific approach appears to have functioned
as intended – over time. However, to a person not em-
bedded within the scientific research infrastructure, it is
not necessarily irrational to report a lower level of trust
in science on the basis of the idea that certain scientific
theories have been wrong, study findings do not always
agree, and in rare cases, findings have been fraudulently
obtained.
Given that trust in science and scientists was the most
meaningful factor predicting profile membership, ac-
counting for a wide variety of potential covariates, sys-
tematically building trust in science and scientists might
be an effective way to inoculate populations against mis-
information related to COVID-19, and potentially other
misinformation. Based on this study’s findings, this
would specifically not take the form of repeatedly articu-
lating factual explanations (especially within a scientific
echo chamber [43]), as this might potentially increase
believability of accurate narratives, but only as one
among other equally believable narratives. Rather, to im-
prove trust in science, we might consider demonstrating
– honestly and openly – how science works, and then
articulating why it can be trusted [40]. Parallel processes
such as implementing recommendations to facilitate
open science [75] may also have the secondary effect of
improving overall public trust in science. Individuals
who both understand [20, 21] and trust science [7, 45]
appear to be most likely to reject explanations with less
supporting evidence while accepting narratives with
more supporting evidence.
Limitations
This study has several limitations. First, to conduct rapid
research amid a pandemic, we used the mTurk survey
platform. As noted in our Methods, this is a widely ac-
cepted research platform across multiple disciplines, but
it does not produce nationally representative data. Thus,
the findings should not be generalized to any specific
population without further study. In addition, we sus-
pect, but cannot confirm, that the results would poten-
tially look different outside of the US. Second, because
COVID-19 emerged recently, and research on COVID-
19 misinformation was initiated even more recently, no
validated questionnaires for believability of COVID-19
misinformation existed at the time of survey administra-
tion. However, we suggest some face validity for our
measures of misinformation believability because the re-
sponse scale was established in prior research [52] and
because the topics were drawn from a reputable list of
misinformed narratives [23]. Third, as with all inferential
models, this study is subject to omitted variable bias
[76], though the magnitude of the association between
the latent profiles and the trust in science variable some-
what attenuates this concern. Fourth, since this was a
cross-sectional study, we cannot assert any causality or
directionality.
Conclusions
Misinformation related to COVID-19 is prolific, has
practical and negative consequences, and is an important
area on which to focus research. This study adds to ex-
tant knowledge by finding evidence of four differential
profiles for believability of COVID-19 narratives among
US adults. Those profiles suggest that believing misinfor-
mation about COVID-19 may not be mutually exclusive
from believing a scientifically accepted explanation, and
that most individuals who believe misinformation believe
multiple different narratives. Our work also provides
provisional evidence that trust in science may be
strongly associated with latent profile membership, even
in the presence of multiple covariates that have been as-
sociated with COVID-19 misinformation in other work
(e.g., political orientation).
We propose several next steps after the current work.
First, a larger, nationally representative sample of indi-
viduals in the US should complete these items, poten-
tially also including common misinformation or
conspiracy theories about other topics likely to affect
health behaviors, like vaccination [77]. Second, it will be
important for future studies to determine whether our
study’s findings can be replicated, are highly
generalizable, and whether additional nuances to the
findings can be identified by the broader scientific com-
munity. Further, longitudinal studies could be structured
to enable causal inferences from the profiles. Third,
there may be utility in validating a general set of mea-
sures related to COVID-19 misinformation believability.
Finally, randomized experiments to determine whether
brief interventions can improve trust in science, and
thereby affect latent profile membership – or even pre-
ventive behavioral intentions – might be useful in sup-
porting the US public health infrastructure.
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